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Introduction
The landmark new Constitution for Europe seeks to define not only the Union's competences but also the very nature of European belonging. Like similar landmark statements and treaties over the last fifty years, the Constitution is clear that the project of European integration -gathered around various economic and political reforms -will falter in the absence of a shared and mobilising cultural commons. And like its predecessors, it ends up defining the commons through heritage and tradition, around a perennial idea of European belonging based around four myths of origin: first, the rule of Roman law; second, solidarity based on Christian charity and mutuality; third, liberal democracy rooted in the rights and freedoms of the individual, and fourth, commonality based on reason and other Enlightenment universal principles.
It is worth asking, however, if this model of belonging is appropriate in an increasingly multicultural and multiethnic Europe. This is not to question the intrinsic merits of the core values, but to cast doubt over their power to fire the imagination and loyalty of a very large section of European society drawing on very different sources of identity and affiliation. Europe is now home to millions of people from non-European backgrounds, many religious and cultural dispositions, and many networks of attachment based on diaspora connections and cultural influences from around the world. Europe is as much a site of longings rooted in tradition -regional, national and European -as it is a site of trans-national and trans-European attachments. The latter attachments are not just held by so-called third county 2 communities and cosmopolitans living in the fast lane of global travel and hybrid identities, but also by native Europeans, now increasingly enmeshed in plural and global consumption norms and patterns. Slowly, Europe is becoming Chinese, Indian, Romany, Albanian, French and Italian, Christian, Islamic, Buddhist or New Age, American, Disneyfied, one-earth conscious, ascetic, and locally communitarian.
It is becoming a place of plural and strange belongings, drawing on varied geographies of cultural formation. And, for this, it is constantly on the move in cultural terms.
What is it to be European in this context? Around what can such diversity be woven together in the name of a shared or common identity, one that does not work with a hierarchy of worth based on ethnic or racial markers? The prevailing Idea of Europe based on the above myths of origin has been seen as the defining cultural trait of the old continent, pitched against, at different times, to tribal 'barbarism', religious society, communist or communalist organisation, and individualism. After September 11 and all that it has led to in terms of the many rushed and thoughtless associations forged between Islam, rogue sates and terrorism, many Western liberals have consciously returned to these core values to propose them with urgency as a new world standard of cohesion and civilisation, against the excesses of Americanism and, above all, the 'terrors' of religious fundamentalism (Dahrendorf, ) .
This new appeal to an old Idea of Europe is dangerous on two counts in the context of the rise of a social world of increasing multicultural and multiethnic belongings.
First, the murmur of a war of crusade between Islam and the secular West arising out of the debris of Bosnia, September 11, Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq, is forging a Euro-centric imaginary of a world split in two camps: a 'West' seen to be peaceloving and civilised because of its Enlightenment and Christian humanist values and an 'East' seen to be bellicose and infantile or irresponsible because of its religious zealotry and tribal behaviour. The old Idea of Europe -despite its claim to universals stripped of ethnic and national moorings -is once again lending its name to demarcate a space of progress and superiority against other worlds defined in ethno-religious terms. Wittingly or not, it is personified in the cultural practices of White, Christian, reasoning Europeans, and perceived as such, it is vulnerable to the anger of the world majority that is judged to be infantile, emotive and unreasonable. Western liberal 3 intellectuals are arrogant to believe in the superiority or universalism of the kind of thinking that underlies the Idea of Europe (Latour, 2002) .
Second, as its universalistic moral pretensions come to be challenged by other world views -from Islam to post-colonial ideologies and a variety of new global lifestyle and consumption norms -the old Idea of Europe will prove to be increasingly vulnerable as a motif for unity in Europe. Who will it appeal to and who will care enough to be carried by it? What will it mean to cosmopolitans and everyday consumers riding the swell of global, made-up-as-you go, global affiliations? How will it fire the imagination and loyalty of minority ethnic groups with loyalties split between host nation and imagined communities dispersed around the world and in non-European histories? Indeed, will it mean much to the growing number of everyday folk in majority communities, who, destabilised by the presence of strangers in their midst as well as the complexities of multiple assaults on their identities, yearn for the simplicity and security of local community and ethno-national belonging?
These yearnings for cultural difference and distinction within Europe itself, as the first part of the paper argues, make the old Idea of Europe a blunt instrument for unity in a Europe that paradoxically is both too big and too small for far too many people as a commons.
A new imaginary of European belonging is needed, it is argued in the second part of the paper; one that acknowledges cultural difference without assuming any order of worth based on ethnicity or religion, and one that is also able to forge a new commons based on values and principles that resonate across Europe's diverse communities.
For this reason, it is claimed that the starting point cannot be the Europeanness of Europe, for example, long standing universals such as universal reason, Catholic piety, or the Protestant work ethic. Instead, an alternative starting point is suggestedone which happens to dig deep into a definition in Socratic Europe of freedom as the product of dialogue and engagement rather than the product of pre-given orders of worth. Such a starting point suggests that empathy/engagement with the stranger could become the essence of what it is to be 'European'.
The paper suggests that two important principles for a new Idea of Europe, both of which have been actively discussed in this journal in a recent debate on 4 cosmopolitanism (volume 19, 2002) , spring out of this interpretation of what it is to be free. The first is the principle of hospitality, which Julia Kristeva has linked etymologically to the original Greek definition of ethos as the habit of regular stay or shelter. In a Europe in which we all will be strangers one day as we routinely movewhether virtually or physically -from one cultural space to another, the principle of refuge will become vital for many more than the minorities that currently need protection from persecution and hardship.
The second principle borne out of the Socratic reading of freedom is mutuality as the basis of identification and belonging. To be European, the paper argues, thus, is a matter of how strangers engage with each other to construct a common public sphere and ethos of solidarity (Calhoun, 2002) . This process involves much more than the "reciprocal recognition of the Other in her/his Otherness", as Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (ref) have most recently argued in a call for Europe to be "united in its diversity". Mutuality requires abandoning both nativist preconceptions of who has first call on the label 'European' as well as easy labelling of immigrants, travellers, ethnic minorities, third-country settlers, Muslims, cosmopolitans, dissidents, as 'nonEuropean'. Mutuality implies that Europeanness is not about possessing a pre-defined cultural identity, but about becoming European through active engagement with, and negotiation of, difference.
Why should it matter that Europe reflects on what it is to be European, on who can lay claim being European, and on what Europe's common values should be? One answer is that in a multiethnic and multicultural Europe, a failure to give open publicity to the principle of empathy with the stranger, all that it represents in shaping identities as well as ensuring cultural change, will play into the hands of ethno-nationalists and xenophobes -abundant in number in both majority and minority communitiesinterested in perpetuating the fiction of homeland cultural identities in Europe.
Europe has a clear choice to make. It can deny the processes of cultural heterogeneity and hybridisation daily at work and allow ethnicity-based antagonisms to grow, aided by an overarching White Europeanist ideal of the good life. Alternatively, it can recognise the coming Europe of plural and hybrid cultures and affiliations and seek to develop an imaginary of becoming European through engagement with the stranger, and in ways that imply no threat to tradition and cultural autonomy.
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The Idea of Europe
The Idea of Europe has a long and varied history, with much written on the topic (see, for example, Delanty, 1995; Heffernan, 1998) . It builds on a long tradition stretching back to the late middle ages, proposing a common European identity based on reason, Christianity and democracy. It has been invoked in the name of: Peace in an often violent continent; Unity against a common enemy (Ottomans, Islam, Empire, Communism, Americanism; and difference from the Other -societies with different moral beliefs and cultural practices. In the 1950s, the architects of European unity saw integration, based on a common European ideal, as a way of decisively avoiding a repeat of the horrors of the Holocaust. In more recent decades, the Idea of Europe has been mobilised to lubricate the case for further economic and political integration, but also to signal Europe's 'civilising' mission in the world, exemplified by Jacques Delors in a lecture to the College of Europe in Bruges:
I find myself dreaming of a Europe … which tends its immense cultural heritage so that it bears fruit, a Europe which imprints the mark of solidarity on a world which is far too hard and too forgetful of its underdeveloped regions … the perennial values of Europe (quoted in Nielsen and Stubb, 1998: 68 per cent of them originating from non-EU countries (CEC, 1997a). 7 A slightly better measure is the proportion of the foreign-born population, which includes immigrants who have acquired the citizenship of the host state, but not their off-spring born in the host state. In 1994 (CEC, 1998) , the proportion of the foreignborn population in a selection of member states was the following: 9.7 per cent in Belgium, 41 per cent of which originated from beyond another EU country; 5.3 per cent in Denmark (of which 74% non-EU); 11 per cent in France (of which 78% non-EU); 9 per cent in the Netherlands (of which 88% non-EU); 6.8 per cent in the UK (of which 71% non-EU); 4.6 per cent in Portugal (of which 77% non-EU); and 9.9 per cent in Sweden (of which 60% non-EU). The inclusion of second and third generation citizens of immigrant parents would significantly inflate these figures (for example, according to the 1991 Census, the non-white population alone in Great Britain was 5.5%).
The member states have become multiethnic and multicultural societies. This is no longer a feature of only the ex-colonial nations such as Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands, or countries such as Germany which imported cheap migrant labour to fuel economic expansion. It marks also countries such as Sweden, Austria, Italy, Greece and Spain in which recent immigration is related to global poverty and flight from repressive regimes.
One starting indicator of how far Europe is prepared for a 'war of the worlds' and the prospect of an 'assimilationist' consensus, gathered possibly around the core European ideals, are public attitudes in the EU towards immigration from non-EU countries. The results are ambivalent. In 1997, the European Year Against Racism, the Commission's Eurobarometer survey (CEC, 1997b) showed that 21 per cent of EU citizens felt that people from the 'South of the Mediterranean' wishing to work in the Union should not be accepted, 60 per cent felt that they should be accepted only with restrictions, leaving only 13 per cent who were willing to accept them without restrictions. The Spanish, Finnish, Irish, Italians, and Portuguese were the most accepting, while more than a quarter of the citizens of Belgium (38%), Greece, France (both 29%), Austria (28%), Germany and Denmark (both 26%) felt that these workers should be rejected. The attitudes to foreigners are equally disturbing. The same survey shows that on average 45 per cent of the EU population believes that there are too many foreigners in their country, 40 per cent believes that there are a lot (but not 8 too many), with only 10 per cent believing that there are not a lot. There are large variations in attitudes between member states, similar to the pattern concerning work migrants, with higher levels of tolerance shown in Finland, Ireland, Spain and Portugal, but with strong feelings against foreigners in Greece (71%), Belgium (60%), Italy (53%), and Germany (52%).
The central question, however, is whether multiethnicity/multinationality is seen to be threatening, and here, the results are counter-intuitive. The 1997 EU survey showed that most Europeans find the presence of people of another nationality (83%) or another race (81%) in their country not disturbing. This seems to be the pattern across How do these mixed attitudes towards foreigners relate to the Idea of Europe? One interpretation is that the signs of tolerance towards others are indicative of an emerging postnationalism or 'banal cosmopolitanism' (Beck, 2002 ) based on everyday cultural mixture and hybridisation (e.g. through consumption), one that has no real need for a grand unifying project such as the traditional Idea of Europe. This is a Europe 'travelling light' (Pieterse, 1999 (Pieterse, , 2001 , carried forward upon the actuality of multiple identities and multiple senses of territorial identification: a plural Europe in continual cultural flux as a consequence of powerful forces of detraditionalisation yielding:
Individuals … enmeshed in multiple bonds of belonging created by the proliferation of social positions, associative networks and reference groups. We enter and leave this system much more than we used to in the past. We are migrant animals. …Thus we are subjected to mounting pressure to change, to transfer, to translate what we were just a moment ago into new codes and new forms of relation (Melucci, 1997: 61) .
Zygmunt Bauman (1997) has claimed that the 'overwhelming feeling of uncertainty'
and 'ambient fear' (p. 50) ensuing from detraditionalisation, deregulation, new world disorder and indeterminacy, puts us in the midst of a new 'heterophilic age' in which the 'question is no longer how to get rid of the strangers and the strange, but how to live with them -daily and permanently ' (p. 88 (Turner, 2000: 28) across all sections of society -minority and majority, indigenous and migrant.
But, all of this assumes the cosmopolitan ethos is widespread, and here, the picture of Europe 'travelling light' is mixed. First, to return to Melucci (1996: 116) , the condition and consciousness of the 'multiple self' are two very different, possibly conflicting, states:
… there is a profound moral implication: the necessity to keep and to lose, to cope with fears and resistances, but also with the ability of going beyond our given identities. [...] The possibility of meeting each other needs a big leap in consciousness, to allow people to accept that they exist as separate individual and social groups, but no less that they can co-exist and communicate.
Without a 'big leap in consciousness' -which is unlikely as long as the European project continues to breed indifference or hostility -'fears and resistances' may well dominate reaction to a perceived erosion of boundaries and threatened national identity. Is this not one way of interpreting the contemporary resurgence of racism, ethno-communalism, religious fundamentalism and nationalist sentiment in Europe?
A Europe without old certainties of belonging, exacerbating a defensive attitude to change and an intolerance towards difference. The many flashpoints, across Europe, of ethnic cleansing, violence towards immigrants and asylum seekers, national flagwaving, regional separatism, minority demands and majority backlashes, provide ample evidence of this possibility.
Then, there is the question of in whose name we can invoke the label hybrid or cosmopolitan. In the considerable debate that there has been on this issues, Jonathan 11 Friedman (1997: 79) has argued compellingly that it describes a restricted cultural elite -'post-colonial border-crossers' such as poets, artists and intellectuals.
Similarly, Robin Cohen (1998: 15) comments:
There are those who celebrate the new uncertainty principles, who explore the luxuriant phenomenology of fragmentation and fluidity for their own narcissistic purposes, and fetishise the borderlands as sites of cultural or political transgression; en route the migrant and asylum-seeker, the unemployed and the down-and-out: all those in need of … security and safety … are often transfigured into a kind of nomadic postmodern hero
by those who take all that for granted.
Recently, Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2001) has responded to this type of criticism by reasserting that the history of human and non human life is one of layered hybridisation, such that the essentialisation of fixed and pure categories, rather than hybridity itself, is the analytical problem. For him, ideas of hybridity highlight the errors of a 'social proclivity to boundary fetishism' (p. 1) responsible for perpetuating 'us' versus 'them' thinking, while the reality remains that of ingrained mixture across the social and geographical spectrum. It may well be that hybridity is more of an everyday phenomenon than its critics assume, but they are right to point out that the celebratory literature glosses over the material and cultural politics of many social worlds involved in little transgression. One such world is that of people who find themselves at the bottom of the social heap -from immigrants and migrants to disaffected youths and the unemployed -often forced into enclave groups and enclave practices for their material and social well-being (through choice and prejudice).
But enclavism is a more general affliction, for across the 'mainstream' in 'ordinary' households, neighbourhoods, workplaces and public spaces, the silent unmooring of community and tradition by hyper-modernisation and globalisation, is reinforcing a strong desire for tangible boundaries against others. We might all be hybrids as Pieterse claims at the level of our daily cultural practices, but few of us seem to accept this, as it questions our own purity and superiority over the outsider. Some cultural conflicts in Europe can be seen in these terms: as a worry of cultural loss resulting from integration, Americanised consumerism, Brussels 'bureaucracy', immigrants and 12 asylum seekers, and the rise of ethnic and other regionalist movements. These are very real worried drawn around sharp geographical and cultural boundaries to mark difference; a far cry from happy hybridity.
Tradition and Difference
Difference matters, and above all to minority ethnic and cultural groups. Take aspects of the cultural practices of the 17 million Muslims in the EU as an example. The early sobriety, piety, and conformity of first generation Muslims (Werbner, 1996) But we should not get too carried away. Accompanying the cosmopolitanism consumption comes ethnic loyalty as a source of communal security and cultural nourishment. This is precisely why, with every step towards national and European cultural assimilation, has grown the demand for denominational schools, cultural and religious autonomy, travel to the 'homeland' or stories of 'home', and reconstructions of family and diaspora histories (Werbner, 1996) . Such desires need not be read as But a new racism, more accurately a new 'cultural fundamentalism' (Stolcke, 1995) that plays on cultural difference as a justification for ethnic separation, has grown as a pan-European phenomenon, in both old and new countries of immigration (Modood, 1997) . While the old form was all about keeping immigrants out or sending them back as undesirable or ill-fitting aliens, the new phenomenon expresses anxieties about the negative implications -both for 'us' and 'them' of 'having them in our midst'. They and their cultural practices -from worship and ideology to consumption 15 and recreation -will dilute and undermine our sacred traditions and our ethnonational integrity. As Verena Stolcke (1995: 12) The second principle for a new Idea of Europe that can be taken from Kristeva is publicity for mutuality as the keystone of cultural constitution in a multiethnic Europe. A familiar refrain in contemporary cultural theory and postcolonial writing is that identities are mutually and dialogically constituted. This is an important premise to situate the social psychology of hospitality itself, which could quite easily be reduced to a requirement of tolerance/pity/empathy on the part of those who are secure and who play the role of host towards the stranger as a needy or destitute figure, which, as such, continues to carry a whole baggage of European moral superiority with it. Equally, hospitality could be read as 'unconditional responsibility for the other', arising 'as a response to fragility and suffering, intimated … in the silent command addressed to me by the other, convoking me to justice and love' (Venn, 2002: 76) , a reading that too is never that far from judgements of moral 20 obligation towards the wretched. In contrast, entangled with the principle of mutuality, hospitality is rendered a two-way process, a relationship of openings and recognition, as Mustafa Dikec (2002) argues, based on 'giving spaces to the stranger where recognition on both sides would be possible' (p. 229, emphasis in original).
The upshot is that:
Hospitality is not about the rules of stay being conditioned by a duality of host and guest with unequal power relations leading to domination; it is about a recognition that we are hosts and guests at the same time in multiple and shifting ways. Hospitality, in this sense, is a refusal to conceive the host and the guest as pre-constituted identities. It is about the recognition that they are mutually constitutive of each other, and thus, relational and shifting as all identities are (Dikec, 2002: 239) .
But, note that the effects of co-constitution are not straightforward. Our embodiment of mobile and multiple identities through our varied interactions with others and with diverse cultural influences in a globalising world rubs against our need for the stranger and strangeness as a boundary object; as not me, as the undesirable or different other. The stranger is in us but also not one of us. This paradox is beautifully captured in the following passage which captures the ambivalent questions of belonging raised by the presence of an age-old traditional Arab scribe writing letters for the illiterate, perched on a street-corner in the centre of fast, modern, Paris:
What to make of the right of presence in Europe of this stranger? Why, indeed, refer to him as the stranger?
Wearing sandals, a turban, wrapped in a djellaba against the autumnal chill, sitting opposite a brand new school, a multicoloured tubular-steeled piece of postmodern architecture, the immobile dignity of this public writer emphasises the disturbing presence of the stranger. His pen, his language, his being, is coeval with mine, I could turn away and pretend that he no longer exists; that he is merely a quaint remnant of yesterday's immigration from the 'Third World', from the Maghreb. I can choose to see in his presence merely the intrusion of the exotic and the archaic in the mundane of modernity. But I can also register a trace, not merely of 21 another world largely hidden from my eyes and understanding, but rather the trace of a language and history that seeks a response, and a responsibility, in mine. Apparently a foreigner, this, too, is clearly his city -certainly more than it is 'mine'. Forced to consider the composite realisation of modern space as it comes into being in this cosmopolitan place called Paris, I also register the alterity that is both integral to it and to the modernity I presume to possess. For the Arab scribe sitting patiently on the corner of a modern, Western city is not a historical accident. Separate, yet indissolubly linked, his presence both interrupts and reconfigures my history, translating the closure of my 'identity' into an aperture in which I meet another who is in the world yet irreducible to my will (Chambers, 2001: 205-6 ).
For Iain Chambers, the challenge of recognition and cultural openness requires a different subjectivity and language, an ethos of journey and incertitude, of acceptance that to be European is to inhabit a 'site that will perpetually cite the unhomely, the uncanny', drawing 'from history a politics of fulfilment whose outcome is never known in advance ' (op cit: 207) . Similarly, Luce Irigaray (2002: 141) suggests that mutuality requires knowledge of 'how to intertwine love of the same and love of the other, faithfulness to self and becoming with the other', so that 'cultural fertility … would result from listening and the effects of mixing'. This is a tall order, calling forth a certain ethical or behavioural consciousness to which few will wish to commit or know how to commit. Europe as the moment -with all its talk of market freedom, individual advancement, impermeable borders -seems to be in no mood to replicate the kinds of cultural experiment launched by the New Left and the student movement in 1968. Indeed, Irigaray too acknowledges that this is a 'new agenda, for which we lack the training' (p. 141).
… Beyond the inter-subjective
Perhaps the challenge, then, is to take up the principle of mutuality at a level beyond the inter-subjective, but as a framing condition for the latter, through its incorporation into a new political philosophy for Europe that 'accept[s] the reality and desirability of cultural diversity', but whose 'constant concern is to keep the dialogue going and 22 nurture a climate in which it can proceed effectively, stretch the boundaries of the prevailing forms of thought, and generate a body of collectively acceptable principles, institutions and policies' ((Parekh, 2000: 340) . Living with others, thus, requires collective endorsement and enforcement through certain shared political rules and values.
For Parekh, two political philosophies can contribute: liberalism, through its emphasis on the rights and freedoms of the individual, underpinned by certain institutional preconditions such as freedom of expression, basic ethical norms and a responsive structure of authority; and a dialogic multiculturalism, based on rights and freedoms of group identities and cultures, coupled to 'essential political virtues as mutual respect and concern, tolerance, self-restraint, willingness to enter into unfamiliar worlds of thought … and the ability to persuade and live with unresolved differences' (op cit: 340). A new Idea of Europe could endorse this dual philosophy, and by doing so, unsettle the prevailing nationalist imaginaries in whose name so much damage is currently inflicted on immigrants and other strangers demonised for their race and ethnicity.
But there is more. Embedded in the principle of living with/becoming through others lies a commitment, in a Deleuzian sense, to a 'diagrammatic' rather than a 'programmatic' politics; one that explores the potentialities of 'making visible something unseen' (Rajchman, 1999: 42) and accepts the future as a 'question of novelty ' (op. cit.: 46) . No pursuit of a pre-determined idea of the good life in a new Europe. Agonism, or the democratic clash of an equal and empowered public, as the substance and goal of political engagement is a key concept here. This shifts the emphasis from a pre-given idea of being European to the idea of becoming European, confident that the juxtaposition of heterogeneity can unlock a 'process of becoming something other, we
know not yet what ' (op. cit.: 48) , hopeful that empathy emerges from:
an attachment to that which differs from you growing out of glimmers of difference in you, an attachment that takes the form of forbearance in strife and generosity in interdependence rather than a quest to close up the distance between you through formation of a higher unity. … This ethos 23 of agonistic respect amidst a world of dissonant interdependencies is crucial to the fabric of democratic politics: … it folds a pathos of distance into democratic relations of contestation, collaboration and hegemony (Connolly, 1993 : 195, cited in Schrift, 2000 .
For all the reasons discussed in this paper, there is no guarantee of a 'pathos of distance' in a free market of multicultural engagement in Europe, but as theorists of radical democracy have suggested, a public sphere that openly acknowledges the right of difference and also offers ample opportunity for the less powerful to stake -and This signals a Europe of 'minor politics', following Gilles Deleuze's distinction between minority and minor politics. While minority politics is often a politics of recognition, relying on fictive ethnicity, a minor politics assumes that 'in some sense we are all potentially from a strange "nowhere" prior to "territorial" definitions', a 'people to come' (Rajchman, 1999: 50) . The disruption of national(ist) state democracy by European integration and globalisation, provides a perfect opportunity for such a reinvention of the political, introducing 'into the concept of democracy the as yet unrepresentable "time" of minority' (op. cit: 52). The promise that Europe is a 'people to come', 'fundamentally incomplete, a postcolonial locus of multiple diasporas' (Werbner, 1997: 263) .
Back to the Commons
These tracings of another Idea of Europe carry powerful symbolic value, which, however, without appropriate practical actions will fail to find popular support. I want to argue in this final section that a small but significant practical step towards 24 Europe as a post-national polity is the deepening and extension (to residents, not just citizens) of constitutionally protected universal rights. These are rights from which follow material protections and benefits, and through this, the possibility of a 'constitutional patriotism' (Habermas, 1998) This equalisation of status, and the geographic and cultural mobility it offers, might also help to loosen the strong ties and loyalties to nation that has been encouraged historically by the coupling of rights to national citizenship. It might, as Turner hopes (2000: 30) , inculcate an 'ideology of membership which will celebrate the uncertainty of belonging where our "final vocabularies" are never final'. In this way, loyalty and commitment may become the product of travel and mobility in a Europe of peripatetic citizenship.
What kind of rights might be included in an EU-model of post-national citizenship?
Soysal has largely human rights in mind, but the coverage can be extended to include other rights -political, economic, and social. To my mind, welfare rights are central among these in terms of their offer of immediate material benefits as well as the change to become someone or something else through education, shelter, health-care, and so on. Gerald Delanty (1997: 293) This is not the place for discussing the details of which welfare rights might be pooled and which retained at the national level. I wish simply to make the basic point that there is much to be gained for inter-culturalism in Europe through a new EU model of citizenship based on trans-European universal rights. It strikes me as less divisive than any attempt to force people to conform to a pre-given Idea of Europe, and more inclusive than never-ending recognition of group-differentiated rights and identities.
Conclusion
At the moment, there is a glimmer of inter-governmental interest in a Europe of the commons supported by enhanced universal rights. The European Charter on Fundamental rights has strengthened the protection of human rights, and in doing so extended coverage to non-citizens. In turn, Article 21 prohibits discrimination based on sex, colour, ethnic and social origin, language and religious belief. It could provide some of the freedoms necessary for Europe as a space of experimentation towards a new model of belonging and becoming. But, it is only a small step and one surrounded by many more EU and national violations of the freedom and potential of the stranger.
A Europe of the commons -including the principles enshrined in the new European Constitution -will have to cease being a Europe of toothless declarations. For one, the threat of racism and xenophobia is real, frightening, and culturally regressive. I
consider it a failing that while the member states have rushed to unite in tightening EU borders on the grounds that excess immigration poses a threat to security and exhausts scarce welfare resources (even if economic migrants are grudgingly welcomed), they have not taken decisive action to punish racism and tackle other forms of cultural fundamentalism. Since the late 1980s, the European Parliament has produced inspiring declarations against racism in Europe, there is some wonderful binding legislation against racism (e.g. Article 13), there is close monitoring of incidences of racism and xenophobia, and the Commission has put forward many 27 proposals for directives to protect displaced persons, third country nationals who are long term residents, and refugees or asylum seekers. Yet, these seem to be rarely invoked, and action is left largely to national governments, who, in turn, have not pressed as strongly as they could for effective EU-wide action, possibly because this leaves them the option of using national anti-racist policies for appeasement 'at home' and vilification of other nations in the Union.
Of course, Craig Calhoun (2002) is right in noting that a constitutional patriotism based on 'thin identities and normative universalism' (p. 157) supported by a regime of rights such as those described in the last part of this paper, will not 'achieve a sufficient solidarity to be truly motivating for its members' (ibid.). As Calhoun argues, the latter requires an active, plural and agonistic public sphere beyond the state and its regimes of rules, working as a living 'realm of cultural creativity as well as rational discourse, and a realm of mutual engagement' (p. 171), so that 'new ways of imagining identity, interests, and solidarity' (ibid) are daily fashioned, thus allowing the 'nature of life together [to be] chosen as it is constructed' (ibid, emphasis in original). On the other hand, it is also surely the case that a Europe of the minorities and minor belongings, stripped free of an old baggage of Eurocentric values, also requires a regime of extended constitutional rights.
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